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SOME COMPETITIVE PRACTICES WITH WHICH
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ALBERT A. CARRETrA*
The Small Business Act,1 approved by the President on July i8, 1958, defines a
small business concern as "one which is independently owned and operated and
which is not dominant in its field of operation."2 This is a rather broad definition,
but it appears adequate for purposes of the present paper. The Small Business Act
also recites a statement of policy which should warm the hearts of those who fear
the current trend to bigness. Included in this statement is the following language:3
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist,
and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to pre-
serve free competitive enterprise....
As of December 3, 1957, there were in existence in the United States 4,322,700
business firms, excepting those engaged in professional services and agriculture.4 The
breakdown of these firms was this:
Construction ................................. 486,700
Manufacturing ............................... 308,600
W holesale ................................... 302,000
Retail trade .................................. 1,878,9oo
Service industries ............................ 768,ioo
All other business ............................ 578,400
4,322,700
Of all these business concerns, almost forty-four per cent were engaged in the
retail trade. Consequently, it can reasonably be assumed that any competitive prac-
tice which affects the retail trade also affects a substantial percentage of the total
business firms in the United States (excepting, again, those engaged in professional
services and agriculture).
If the retailers were asked to name their most pressing business problem today,
their general answer would be "discount houses." For about a quarter of a century,
there has been a slow but continuous growth in the number of retail outlets which
have attracted the consumers' dollars through use of the word "discount." Although
the practice of price-cutting employed by such outlets is by no means new, the
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apparent recent growth in sales made by discount houses is beginning to cause
their competitors to "sit up and take notice." Yet, obviously, this concern with the
problem of discount houses will not, without further action, increase the number
of sales recorded on the cash registers of the millions of independent retailers
throughout the United States.
Too many Americans, both in the ranks of management and of distribution,
make the error of looking upon the present period of intense and sometimes un-
scrupulous competition as being only a temporary condition. They plan to wait
patiently until the "temporary condition" has righted itself. However, the adoption
of such a plan by independent retailers plagued with the competition of discount
houses can only lead to business failures.
To discuss this special problem that faces the retail distributors, it will be neces-
sary to define certain terms so as properly to limit the application of the conclusions
reached.
"Retailers" generally are considered to be merchants who buy articles in large
quantities and who sell such articles in small quantities, usually to ultimate con-
sumers. But since such a definition would include discount houses, it will have to
be qualified. As used herein, "retailers" are only those merchants who do business
in the so-called "fair trade" states, and who buy articles in large quantities and
sell such articles in small quantities at or above the stipulated or minimum prices
set by the manufacturers in fair trade agreements. Such a definition, of course,
excludes discount houses. For convenience, those falling within this definition will
also sometimes be referred to as "conventional retailers" or "ethical retailers."
"Fair trade" is more often than not misunderstood. As used herein, the term
"fair trade" shall refer to the method of merchandising originally legalized by the
statutes enacted in forty-five states of the United States,5 commonly referred to as
fair trade statutes. The Miller-Tydings Act of I937' and the McGuire Act of 19527
exempted fair trade contracts from the prohibitions of the Sherman Antitrust Act"
and the Federal Trade Commission Act
These state laws generally permit, but they do not compel, a manufacturer
of certain goods identified by a trade-mark, brand, or name to guard the property
value of such trade-mark, brand, or name by permitting him to set the minimum
prices at which such products may be resold. They generally provide that the min-
imum resale price provision of fair trade contracts shall be binding not only upon all
distributors who sign such contracts, but also upon all other distributors of the
same products who have knowledge of the existence of a fair trade contract between
a manufacturer and a distributor covering the same products identified by a trade-
mark, brand, or name. No retailer or distributor is required to carry and offer for
'CCH TRADE REG. REP. 3075 (ioth ed. 1956).
a 50 STAT. 693, 15 U.S.C. 3§ x et seq. (952).
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38 STAT. 717 (914), 15 U.S.C. H3 41 et seq. (1952).
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sale any fair-traded product. But if a retailer does, and he either enters into a fair
trade contract with the manufacturer, or knows of the existence of such a contract,
then he must respect the minimum resale price provision of such contract.
The state fair trade statutes should not be confused with any of the unfair
practices acts adopted by many of the states; or with any of the state anti-price dis-
crimination acts; or with the Robinson-Patman Act;"0 or with any other antitrust
legislation of either the federal government or of the state governments.
"Discount houses" could very simply be defined as "price-cutters." But not all
price-cutters are intended to be covered herein. "Discount houses" have been de-
fined as retail distributors who sell merchandise at a discount from the manufacturer's
listed retail price or from the price at which other types of retailers sell the same
merchandise. This definition, however, is too broad for the purposes of this article.
Because of the current controversy over the economic wisdom of fair trade statutes,
the term "discount houses" as used herein shall apply only to those retail distributors
located in a fair trade state who sell articles at prices below the minimum resale
prices legally fixed by the manufacturers thereof in a fair trade agreement of which
the retail distributors have knowledge. It can readily be seen that this definition
excludes the ordinary price-cutters, who have no obligation to maintain prices. This
definition also excludes those retail distributors who cut price on articles which are
not fair-traded by the manufacturers, but which carry only "suggested" resale prices.
The consuming public has been told over and over again that fair trade means
fixed prices at high levels. Many consumers have believed this assertion because
at the same time it was being made by discount house operators, these same operators
were offering the public fair-traded items at less than the minimum resale prices
fixed by the manufacturers of those items. Why then did at least a majority of the
legislatures of forty-five states vote for fairly uniform state fair trade statutes? Why
then did approximately ninety-one per cent of the congressmen voting at the time
favor the enactment of the McGuire Act?
I
PuRPosEs oF FAIr TRADE LEGISLATION
Remembering the old maxim that "there is a little bit of good in every bad little
boy," let us examine a typical fair trade law to determine if it has any good points.
First and foremost, these statutes generally provide that resale price maintenance
agreements may be entered into only with respect to commodities which bear the
trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer of such commodity. Thus, resale price
maintenance agreements would seem illegal when entered into with respect to any
commodity which does not bear the trade-mark, brand, or name of its producer.
Obviously, the aim of the statutes was to protect the property-namely, the good
will-of the producer; and the price restriction provision was adopted as an appropri-
10 49 STA. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13c, 2ia (1952).
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ate means to that perfectly legitimate end, and not as an end in itself. Such was the
opinion of a unanimous Supreme Court in December i936.P
Quite frequently, because of the quality of his product or the waging of an ex-
tensive advertising campaign, a manufacturer's trade-name become valuable to re-
tailers who distribute his product. Even when the product of other manufacturers
is almost equally good, the trade name may assure to the retailer a ready market
for the product. Now, if the manufacturer sold his product directly to the ultimate
consumer, there would be no question of his right and ability to control the price
at which the product would reach the public. If, however, instead of selling directly
to the ultimate user, the manufacturer decided, perhaps long ago, to use retail outlets
as his distributors, the situation is somewhat different.
Undeniably, when a retail outlet purchases the product, title thereto passes to the
retailer. But the retail distributor is dealing not with a commodity alone, but with
a commodity plus the brand-name which it carries as evidence of its origin and the
quality for which the brand-name stands. Despite the ownership he may acquire
of the product, the retailer cannot acquire ownership of the trade-name or the good
will which it symbolizes. As the Supreme Court has put it:' 2
The ownership of the good will, we repeat, remains unchanged, notwithstanding the
commodity has been parted with.
If a retailer who desired to sell below the manufacturer's nationally advertised
price were willing to remove the trade-name from the product and to neither state nor
imply that they were the same as the nationally advertised goods, then the retailer
would seem clearly entitled to sell at whatever price he pleased. However, discount
houses are totally unwilling to market a popular product in this manner. And so
they run afoul of the Supreme Court's pronouncement:'3 "Ownership of the goods
does not carry the right to sell them with a specific mark." The fair trade laws give
effect to this view.
Fair trade laws generally provide that, to be the subject of a permissible resale
price maintenance agreement, a commodity must be "in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others." This
is a basic antimonopoly provision contained in state fair trade statutes, in the Miller-
Tydings Act, and in the McGuire Act, and it is important because it prevents
gouging of the consuming public and the fixing of fair trade prices at high levels.
The prices of commodities sold in free and open competition with other commodities
of the same general class will always be subject to the powerful forces of competitive
bids and offers. If the manufacturer of a trade-marked product which is fair-
traded should market his product at a price that the consumer deems too high,
then the consumer will naturally purchase a commodity of the same general class
which is produced by another manufacturer who does fair-trade his product at a
x' Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
2 1d. at 195.
13 Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 26o U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
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lower price. Moreover, it should be remembered that a manufacturer establishes his
fair trade price at his own peril-especially the peril that if he sets it too high, either
the consumer will not buy the product or, should the article remain populai none-
theless, the high profits will invite even more competition from other manufacturers.
If trade-marked products which are subject to resale price maintenance agreements
actually are in free and open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced by others, then in due course, any fixed resale prices with too much
"fat" will eventually-as the natural result of competition-be reduced to a level
that consumers are willing to pay. This circumstance is not generally understood,
because the consuming public has been told repeatedly that fair trade means fixed
prices at high levels.
As a further protection to the consumer, state fair trade laws and the McGuire
Act do not countenance price-fixing agreements between or among competitors-
that is, competitors may not combine to fix prices. Only "vertical"--and not "hori-
zontal"-agreements are permitted under the fair trade statutes.
The problem which confronts the ethical retailers of today is basically one of
unscrupulous competition and discriminatory enforcement of fair trade agreements
by manufacturers. Price-cutters of fair-traded items in the great majority of cases
realize that their activities can be enjoined without too much difficulty by the
institution of a suit either by the manufacturers of the products being sold at cut
prices or by a competing retailer. But the price-cutters are willing to take the cal-
culated risk because they know that enforcement is difficult and because they feel
that even a court order may result in increased sales by them of other articles when
the public is advised that they have been enjoined from selling a product below the
price fixed by a manufacturer. The sympathy of the public often results in a greater
volume of sales.
Everyone has the urge to buy goods as cheaply as possible. However, as President
McKinley once put it:14
I do not prize the word cheap. It is not a word of hope; it is not a word of comfort;
it is not a word of cheer; it is not a word of inspiration! It is the badge of poverty; it is
the signal of distress; ... [C]heap merchandise means cheap men, and cheap men mean
a cheap country.
In the price-cutting wars of the i93o's, we had become a "cheap" country, with a
vengeance. However, before long, it was realized that preserving the corner drug-
store was more important than saving a few pennies on a tube of toothpaste. Today,
the displacement of the small independent businessman presents a grave danger to
our economy-and to our society. America should be under no illusions about
the value or effect of promiscuous price-cutting. It has, indeed, been a potent weapon
of monopoly-a means of killing the small rival.
"' Campaign speech delivered at Cleveland, Ohio, Oct. 5, 1889, entitled Protection and Revnue, in
SPEECHES AND 1ADDRESSES oF WILLIAm McKINLEY 368, 376 (1894).
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II
IETAILERS' REMEDIES
After this review of the basic philosophy of the fair trade statutes, let us now turn
to a consideration of the possible avenues of relief for the conventional retailers who
distribute fair-traded merchandise.
First, it should be clear that if a retailer is doing business in a state which does
not have a fair trade statute, he cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be heard
to complain that he is being hurt by the price-cutting tactics of his competitor. How-
ever, if he finds that his competitor is selling a product either below or only slightly
higher than the price at which he is able to buy it from the same manufacturer or
producer, it would pay him to query whether his competitor is being favored by a
special price from the manufacturer in violation of existing state law and possibly in
contravention of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Fur-
ther, even if the manufacturer is not engaging in a discriminatory pricing practice,
it may develop that the retail competitor who is cutting prices is "selling below
cost" in violation of laws in effect in many of our states. Where interstate commerce
is involved, it is also unlawful to sell goods at unreasonably low prices for the pur-
pose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. 15
Second, even in a state which does have a fair trade statute, if the particular
commodity involved has not been fair-traded by the manufacturer, then, under
ordinary circumstances, a retailer cannot complain of the price-cutting tactics of
his competitor. This statement is, of course, subject to the same qualifications as
indicated above concerning possible violations of other state and federal statutes.
But the problem facing most retailers today is not one existing in non-fair trade
states and not one pertaining to non-fair-traded items. The problem has to do with
price-cutting on items which have been fair-traded in states which have fair trade
statutes. What can the conventional retailers do to protect themselves against the
inroads being made by the discount houses? Should the conventional retailers "throw
in the towel" and imitate the example of the discount houses? Or should they seek
to compel adherence to the letter and spirit of our fair trade statutes?
Many manufacturers enter into fair trade agreements with their distributors and
then do a fairly conscientious job of policing such fair trade agreements. However,
there are some who fair-trade their products and then seek to maintain a "double-
dealing standard" by compelling small retail outlets to adhere to the fair trade prices,
while at the same time dosing their eyes to the open and notorious price-cutting of
the discount houses which handle a large volume of goods and which are in compe-
tition with the small independent retailers.
As a general principle, the less government intervention in business, the better.
However, under certain circumstances, the government has not only a right, but also
a duty to supervise the conduct of business in the public interest. Government
" ; 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
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should come into the picture only to assure that the rules of the game are fair and
that they are enforced in a way that will enhance our economic productivity.
Section 5(a) (i) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides very generally
that:'
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
But what are unfair methods of competition? What are unfair acts or practices?
What are deceptive acts or practices? These are very important questions which
the Federal Trade Commission has, for many years, been answering. The basic law
itself is not definitive; and it probably was not made definitive because Congress
could not possibly have enumerated all of the unfair methods of competition and
all of the unfair or deceptive acts or practices capable of being engaged in by business-
men. Consequently, from time to time, the Federal Trade Commission is called upon
to determine whether a new method of competition or a new act or practice is
violative of the statute because it is unfair.
Given a set of circumstances wherein a manufacturer picks and chooses those
against whom he will seek enforcement of the minimum resale price provision, is
there any legislative authority for the FTC to intervene and enjoin such discrim-
inatory practice? In my opinon, there is. The Commission, for about forty years
now, has been attempting to ban unfair methods of competition in commerce.
Since 1938, the Commission has also sought to ban unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce. The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
prohibits certain specified discriminatory practices in commerce. The theory of all
of these laws has been that competitors should start their race at the same starting
point. If this is correct, is it fair for a manufacturer to compel one distributor to
abide by a minimum resale price provision in a fair trade agreement, and at the
same time sell to a competitor of such distributor (let us call that competitor a dis-
count house) and not require the competitor to respect the minimum resale price
fixed by the manufacturer?
Some might ask: "If the Federal Trade Commission should take such action,
would it not in effect be seeking enforcement of the fair trade agreements?" The
answer is "No." The Commission would not be seeking to enforce any agreement.
It would only be seeking equal treatment of all distributors of the same manufacturer.
It is submitted that the FTC has full authority to enjoin a manufacturer from dis-
criminating in this manner. In compliance with an order of the Commission, the
manufacturer would have the choice of doing one of two things: He would subse-
quently either have to enforce his minimum resale price provision against all dis-
tributors; or he would have to abandon all fair trade agreements. The choice would
be up to the manufacturer; the Federal Trade Commission would not order him
either to enforce or not to enforce the provisions of fair trade agreements. All that
the Commission could order him to do would be to treat all distributors alike.
"o 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(r) (1952).
176 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
If this step were taken by the Federal Trade Commission, could it be accused of
going beyond congressional intent? That any such criticism would be unjustified
seems clear from a perusal of some of the provisions of the Clayton Act, as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2(d) of the Clayton Act makes it unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce to pay a customer for services or facilities unless
such payment is available to all competing customers on proportionally equal terms.P
Section 2(e) prohibits the furnishing to one purchaser of services or facilities not
accorded to all others on proportionally equal terms18
Obviously, the congressional intent was that customers be treated either equally or
on proportionately equal terms. However, where a seller in interstate commerce
offers a purchaser a contract with ten restrictive provisions, and at the same time
offers to a competitor of such customer a contract with only nine restrictive pro-
visions, it appears that the latter may receive a competitive advantage over the former
and that, this, in turn, may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. (For purposes of the example, the tenth restrictive provision might be
one pertaining to the maintenance of minimum resale prices.)
Let me not be misunderstood as stating that the discriminatory enforcement of the
minimum resale price provisions of a fair trade agreement violates the Clayton Act,
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. If there is a violation of law-and it is
submitted that there is-then the violation is of section 5(a) (i) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
Another matter of importance in connection with this problem concerns the rather
widespread impression that the Sherman Act is violated if two or more retailers, or
two or more wholesalers, combine to enforce compliance with a legal fair trade
agreement. It is submitted that two or more individuals, whether or not competi-
tors on the same business level, may combine when they seek only the enforcement
of a legal contract. Very often, small retailers are not financially able to undertake
the expense involved in bringing one or more suits against competitors who violate
fair trade agreements. If two or more retailers may not combine and share legal
expenses, it may mean that their businesses will be ruined and the discount house
or discount houses in the area will subsequently enjoy a monopoly in the area for
the distribution of the particular merchandise involved.
There is no question that responsibility for fair trade enforcement lies primarily
with the manufacturers. Nevertheless, the fair trade laws generally provide that
any injured party may undertake enforcement; and frequently, a retailer is in a better
position to obtain fair trade enforcement than the manufacturer himself, since a
retailer can seek an injunction against price-cutting on all fair-traded items offered
for sale by him and by the discount house, but a manufacturer's complaint would
necessarily have to be restricted to his own fair-traded products.
1 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § x3 (d) (1952).
"a Id. § 13(e).
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If two or more injured retailers may combine in a suit to enforce one or more
fair trade contracts, it seems logical to conclude that a manufacturer may combine
with one or more of his retailers for the same purpose. With retailers filing the
suits and with the manufacturers defraying the costs, a system of fair trade enforce-
ment of maximum efficiency and of maximum economy would seem to have been
discovered.
It is understood that small businesses have already been closed and bankruptcies
have resulted because of the practices of discount houses. For their own self-preserva-
tion, retailers should solicit the assistance of the FTC when manufacturers discrim-
inate in their enforcement of the minimum resale provision of fair trade agreements.
Further, if retailers feel that they should protect their business by combining with
their competitors only for the purpose of seeking compliance with fair trade agree-
ments, and if the Department of Justice should advise them that such a combination
may be deemed to violate the Sherman Act, then such businessmen should ask the
Department to co-operate with them in bringing about a test case of this interpreta-
tion. In this same connection, it is interesting to note the statement of Federal Trade
Commissioner Secrest at a recent Trade Practice Conference in Chicago:19 "You
can't be accused of collusion if you all get together to enforce the law. Now, if you
get together to break it, you would be in collusion." Although Commissioner Secrest
was referring to combinations of competitors to secure enforcement of Trade Practice
Rules promulgated by the FTC, the principle seems applicable to combinations to
enforce fair trade agreements.
In order to gain first-hand knowledge about fair trade, a subject of vital concern
to small business, the Subcommittee on Retailing, Distribution, and Fair Trade Prac-
tices, of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business sought information from the
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who are actually practicing fair trade. Dur-
ing this survey conducted in mid-i9 56, when asked about the probable effect on their
companies and industries if the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts were repealed, 231
firms felt that there would be substantial adverse effect upon their companies spe-
cifically and the industry as a whole. One manufacturer voiced apprehension over
the status of small business, saying:2°
We would consider that very serious effects would be encountered by our firm, as well
as other small industries, should the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act be repealed.
The reason for our concern is that big business with its unlimited capital and huge re-
sources, could stand a program of narrow margins of profit should cutrate prices prevail
in the wholesale and retail field, whereas small businesses would be seriously crippled
and perhaps wiped out; in view of the present standard of inflation now prevailing in this
country, and with the cost of doing business going up percentagewise a large group of
small businesses would be wiped out should the two acts heretofore mentioned be repealed.
"
0FTC Transcript of Trade Practice Conference for the Work Glove Industry, Oct. 10, 1958.
10 Select Committee on Small Business of the Senate, Fair Trade, S. REP. No. 2819, 84 th Cong., 2d
Sees. 11 (1956).
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III
THE FTC PosmoN
The Federal Trade Commission, on February 21, 1955, announced that it had
denied an application for a Commission investigation into resale price agreement
enforcement practices of certain unnamed manufacturers in the jewelry industry. In
requesting action by the Commission, the applicants had charged that the manu-
facturers were using retail jewelers as a "show case stimulus to the business of dis-
count houses" by forcing jewelers to hold to fair trade prices while allowing or en-
couraging discount houses to undercut fair trade prices.
In a letter to the applicants, the FTC rejected the theory that the applicants were
engaged in unfair methods of competition in violation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. Because of its importance, the letter is quoted in full in a footnote.'
21 
"Dear Sirs:
"Reference is made to your application to the Commission on behalf of , in
which you complain of alleged unlawful practices of certain unnamed manufacturers of watches, silver-
ware, appliances, and related goods. You charge therein that these manufacturers discriminate between
competing distributors of their product by deliberately selling fair-trade merchandise to so-called discount
houses without requiring adherence to the fair trade prices, at the same time enforcing fair trade prices
against retail jewelers. The purpose of such discrimination, it is alleged, is to establish the fair-traded
retail jewelers as a 'show case stimulus to the business of discount houses.' The application charges that the
disparate treatment of competing groups constitutes an unfair method of competition in violation of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commission is requested to initiate an immediate
investigation into the cited activities.
"The matter has been given intensive study by the Commission. For purposes of settling the legal
issues involved, all factual allegations of the application, however controversial, have been construed in a
light most favorable to the application.
"The Commission nevertheless decides, for the reasons set forth below, that the matter is not one in
which Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction could be invoked.
"The authority of the Federal Trade Commission under fair trade is sharply circumscribed by the
provisions of the McGuire Act. The Act does not impose on the Commission any affirmative regulatory
duties; it does not in terms prohibit any practice nor require the Commission to take corrective action
towards proscribed activities. The Act is exemptive and permissive. It specifies the conditions under
which fair trade pricing and the rights of action created by State fair trade laws are exempt from the
Federal antitrust laws.
"The Commission has consistently taken the position that it is not within the province of the Federal
Trade Commission to exercise control over resale price agreements nor to enforce such agreements. Where
resale price agreements are lawful under applicable State law, the Commission understands the McGuire
Act as barring antitrust authorities from concerning themselves with the rights and obligations brought
into existence by those agreements. Enforcement has been left exclusively to private litigation.
"The Commission agrees, however, that the withdrawal from the area of lawful fair trade should not
be given too broad a connotation. It is fairly apparent that in varying competitive contexts-where the
practice is not 'lawful,' or it is an integral part of a greater trade restraint-it may be attacked under
the Federal antitrust laws. (Cf. United States v. Univis Lens, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (944); Eastman Kodak v. F.T.C., 158 F.2d 592 (1946).)
But no contention is here made that the fair trade agreements entered into by these manufacturers are
unlawful. The application apparently rests on the theory that the manufacturers utilize the device of fair
trade to affect a larger competitive restraint-that is, an unlawful discrimination between competing
channels of distribution in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commission
cannot validate that theory.
"The application declares that remedies and corrective procedures made available at State Law, 'have
proved completely ineffective to remedy the wrong' and are 'not the answer to the problem.' These
remedies inhere in the right afforded the manufacturer, competing retailers, and any person damaged by
the willful and knowing action of sellers undercutting the fair trade price to bring an action in State
court. The action may be either a damage suit, where the violator is a signatory to a fair trade
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With respect to the Commission's position that the McGuire Act does not impose
upon the FTC any affirmative regulatory duties and does not in terms prohibit any
practice or require the Commission to take affirmative action towards proscribed
activities, it is important to examine the McGuire Act closely. The first section sets
forth the purpose of the legislation,22 and the second amends section 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act by adding four new paragraphs, numbered 5(a) (2)
through 5(a)(5). Paragraphs 5(a) (x) and 5(a)(6) are not new, but they are
included in the McGuire Act as part of the amended section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
contract, or a suit for injunctive relief which is available against signers and nonsigners alike. Assuming
the truth of applicants' allegation that no relief against price cutters has been forthcoming from the
manufacturers, it is still clear that applicants may resort to various avenues of self-help to correct the
conditions of which they complain.
"In the first instance, fair-trading retailers may sue for injunctive relief against offending discount
houses under the applicable State Acts. Relief would not be conditioned upon proof of the manu-
facturer's intent or of his complicity in the price cutting; proof need only be shown of the discounter's
knowledge and willful disregard of the fair trade price.
"But beyond injunctive relief against competing discounters, retailers have a further broad area of
self-help available: disregarding the resale prices fixed by the manufacturer and competing on a price
basis with the discount houses. The decisions of State courts under the fair trade acts make it clear
that where a manufacturer discriminates in the enforcement of his resale prices among competing cus-
tomers, or fails to display reasonable diligence in enforcement, or neglects to enforce, that fact constitutes an
adequate defense in a later enforcement proceeding by the manufacturer against a price-cutting seller.
These decisions invoke the equity principle of 'unclean hands' against the manufacturer, or hold that
he has 'waived' his rights under the contract, or 'abandoned' his rights under the State statute. Thus,
a retailer forced to cut prices to compete, under conditions here alleged, could do so with impunity.
"The application has sought to anticipate this second self-help technique by declaring that a retailer
is not himself required to violate a contract, law, or public policy to obtain equal footing with his
favored competitor, citing in support of this contention Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc.,
291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934), a lottery case, where it was stated:
'A method of competition which casts upon one's competitors the burden of the loss of business
unless they will descend to a practice which they are under a powerful moral compulsion not
to adopt, even though it is not criminal, was thought to involve the kind of unfairness at which
the statute was aimed.'
Inferentially, the status of retail jewelers is equated with that of the disfavored competitors in Keppel.
But the present situation differs markedly from Keppel. As a matter of law, if a manufacturer has
persisted in the course of conduct here alleged, he has forfeited his rights to enforcement and there is
no longer any legal obligation-or at least any legally enforceable obligation-upon a retailer to continue
to observe the manufacturer's fixed prices. In contrast to the lottery method of Keppel, it cannot
seriously be suggested that price competition is morally reprehensible.
"The Federal Trade Commission must act in the public interest, to affirm, wherever possible, the basic
competitive rationale of our free enterprise economic system. The Commission believes that the applicants
here, through their own lawful efforts, may obtain the relief desired. In the absence of a showing that
circumstances foreclose such efforts, the Commission cannot invoke antitrust sanctions in support of
aggrieved applicants reluctant to effect that measure of self-help which would alleviate their condition.
"No ground is cited which affords a present basis for a proceeding under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
"The application for an investigation has been denied.
"By direction of the Commission.
Robert M. Parrish
Secretary."
Federal Trade Comm'n Press Release, Feb. 21, 1955.
2 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 note (1952). The amended statute, as contained in the Code, does
not set forth the purpose of the McGuire Act amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act. Such
purpose, as enacted by Congress, is set forth in the footnote, entitled "Purpose of Act July 14, 1952."
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Even if the new sections do not impose any affirmative regulatory duties upon the
Commission or in terms prohibit any practice, why would the Commission expect
Congress to include in these new sections language which was already in the two
old sections-language reaffirmed by Congress when it passed the McGuire Act.
Section 5(a) (i) reads:2"
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
Section 5(a) (6), with inapplicable deletions, states :24
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations . .. from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
While the four new sections in the McGuire Act do not, when taken alone, impose
upon the Commission any affirmative regulatory duties, and while they do not in
terms prohibit any practice or require the Commission to take corrective action
towards proscribed activities, how can the Commission ignore the provisions of
sections 5(a) (i) and 5(a) (6) which have been part of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act for many years? Section 5(a) (6) not only empowers the Commission to
take certain action, it actually directs the Commission to do so. Congress could not
have made its intention any plainerl
The four new sections added to section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act by the McGuire Act merely provide that certain contracts or agree.ments illegal
before the enactment of the McGuire Act were cleansed of such illegality by the
passage of the McGuire Act. However, there is nothing in the McGuire Act which
exempts practices, as distinguished from contracts or agreements, from the provisions
of the Federal Trade Commission Act or of the antitrust laws. Consequently, if a
practice was illegal prior to the enactment of the McGuire Act, it is still illegal now,
because the McGuire Act exempts only the certain contracts or agreements described
therein.
Th FTC emphasizes that it has consistently taken the position that it is not
within its province to exercise control over, or to enforce, resale price agreements.
Obviously, Congress never intended for the Commission to undertake such enforce-
ment. However, if the FTC should take action with a view to enjoining a manu-
facturer from continuing the practice of enforcing minimum resale provisions of a
fair trade agreement against only some of his distributors, would the Commission
be enforcing fair trade agreements? Of course not! Instead, the FTC would only
be seeking equal treatment of all distributors by the same manufacturer.
Paragraph six of the Commission's letter remarks:
It is fairly apparent that in varying competitive contexts-where the practice is not
"lawful," or it is an integral part of a greater trade restraint-it may be attacked under
the Federal antitrust laws. (Emphasis added.)
" 66 STAT. 632, x5 U.S.C. § 45(a) (x) (1952). 24id. § 45(a)(6).
COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
However, in the next sentence the Commission adds:
But no contention is here made that the Fair Trade agreements entered into by these
manufacturers are uiiiawful. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, a nimble transition is made from "practices" to "agreements.:
Why should "agreements" and their legality be involved in the first place? The
jeweler-petitioners were complaining to the Commission about the practice of some
manufacturers who discriminate among competing retailers by deliberately selling
fair-traded merchandise to the discount houses without requiring adherence to the
fair trade prices and at the same time enforcing those prices against other retail
jewelers. If the practice is not lawful, it should make no difference whether the
agreement involved is a fair trade agreement or any other kind of agreement; and,
likewise, it should make no difference whether the underlying agreement is lawful or
unlawful.
In its letter, the FTC seems to indicate, though it never expressly so states, that
complaining retailers who seek to abide by fair trade agreements should first exhaust
all other remedies open to such retailers before they come to the Commission for
assistance. While it is true that the complaining retailers do have the right to resort
to other avenues of relief, it is not required by any statute that they exhaust such
avenues before presenting their problem to the FTC. Section 5 (b) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act provides, in part:2 5
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person ... has been
or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act in commerce, and if
it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to
the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person.., a complaint stating
its charges....
Thus, the only two statutory prerequisites for FTC action are: (i) the Commission
must have reason to believe that a particular person has been, or is, using an unfair
practice in commerce; and (2) the Commission must believe that a proceeding by it in
respect thereto would be in the public interest. Clearly there is no requirement
in the statute that the Commission find that no avenues of self-help are available to
the complaining party.
The ninth paragraph of the Commission's letter is especially surprising. There,
in effect, the Commission recommends that a distributor violate and ignore the
provisions of a valid agreement entered into between himself and the manufacturer.
This reasoning that "two wrongs make a right" might involve the retailer who
adopted it in some very unfortunate litigation. It is, indeed, extraordinary for the
FTC to tender legal advice on a matter that is so controversial and is not covered
by any of the laws which the Commission administers.
In the eleventh paragraph of its letter, the Commission emphasizes that it "cannot
invoke antitrust sanctions in support of aggrieved applicants reluctant to effect that
25 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 52 STAT. 1028 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1952).
182 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
measure of self-help which would alleviate their condition." It has already been
noted in this paper that Congress certainly never evidenced any intention to require
an exhaustion of remedies. The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act, is also an antitrust statute and is also administered by the FTC. Section eleven
of that Act provides:"
Whenever the Commission... shall have reason to believe that any person is violating
or has violated any of the provisions of sections two, three, seven and eight of this Act,
it shall issue and serve upon such person . . . a complaint stating its charges in that
respect....
Under that Act, the Commission does not even have to hold that a proceeding
in respect thereof would be in the public interest. Where then does the FTC find
authority for its view that "antitrust sanctions" can only be invoked in favor of those
applicants who have already utilized all available self-help?
CONCLUSION
In a recent public address, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, a leading protagonist
for small business in the United States, commented that "there has been considerable
evidence in recent years that our business climate contains many elements hostile
to the well-being of the average independently-owned and operated small business
concerns."'' The small businesses are fighting hard for survival, and it behooves
the federal government to render whatever statutory assistance is possible and con-
sistent with the public interest.
Senator Humphrey also said: "At the present time, the retailer exists in what
has been described as an atmosphere of catastrophe." He referred to a statement
made by Mr. Victor Lebow, a marketing consultant, who had testified before the
Senator's subcommittee during its study of discount house operations. Mr. Lebow
told the subcommittee that a retail store opening today has only a seventy-four per
cent chance of surviving beyond its first half year of existence; it has a forty-nine per
cent chance of living 2 years; and only seventeen per cent will still be in existence
ten years from now.
Obviously, many causes exist for the small businessman's plight-among them:
(I) discriminatory pricing practices; (2) combinations and agreements among the
larger firms; (3) mergers and consolidations that accentuate the trend towards "big-
ness"; (4) tax inequities which work to the disadvantage of the smaller businesses;
and (5) lack of adequate sources of capital at reasonable interest rates. However,
the existence of many other problems for the small businessman does not excuse
failure to take steps to stamp out the discrimination in fair trade practices which has
been the subject of this paper.
-2 64 STAT. 1125 (950), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952).
"
7 From an address by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey before a convention of the National Association of
Retail Druggists, Oct. 2, 1958.
